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I. Introduction
If you ask a Japanese civil law scholar whether or not marriage between 
same-sex parties is allowed under the current Civil Code, they would likely give 
you a negative answer. Since the 1980s, when the first legal studies on same-sex 
couples appeared, a wall of silence isolates this topic from mainstream 
discussions. Few scholars dare to step into this legal quandary and those who do 
dare to venture into the unknown find themselves giving oversimplified 
explanations or avoiding clear statements. Nevertheless, even the apparent 
marriage equality supporters do not budge: there is no room for marriage 
between same-sex parties under the current Civil Code.
Outside academia, the situation is not any different. Until February 14, 
2019, same-sex couples had not yet challenged the courts as to why marriage 
between same-sex parties should not be permitted under the current Japanese 
legal system. A glance at the legal arguments presented by the recent social-
cause oriented lawsuits reveals that even lawyers, who should be freer than 
scholars to question issues for which they do not necessarily have a clear answer, 
succumb to the pressure imposed by that absolute silence. From the second half 
of the 20th century until the beginning of this century, most civil law handbooks 
did not mention sexual difference as a condition for legal marriage. Therefore, it 
seemed that the discussion concerning the sexual difference of contracting 
parties was something strange to Japanese family law. Given that the oldest 
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reference to same-sex marriage found in a the second half of the 20th century 
refers to Wagatsuma’s handbook, which, in turn, cites Nakagawa, it seems then, 
that it all started with Nakagawa. However, Nakagawa does not leave us with 
more than an outdated legal theory (the “substantial intention theory [実質的意思
説 ]”) condensed into an awkward metaphor: “In the same manner people cannot 
marry a book, people cannot marry a person of the same-sex, because there 
would be no intention to marry” (中川 , 1942, p. 189).
This assumption – the very belief that the discussion on sexual difference as 
a condition for legal marriage is something relatively new – is, however, 
unwarranted. In fact, the sexual difference between the spouses was a rather 
standard topic mentioned in prewar civil law handbooks. In this paper, I 
summarize some of the discussions related to the restriction of same-sex 
marriages in the process of codification (II) and in the prewar civil law academy 
(III). Finally, I will make a few remarks as to the meaning of these findings (IV). 
II. Sexual Difference in the Civil Code
Neither the Boissonade Code (1890) nor the Meiji Code (1898) has any 
provision restricting marriage between same-sex parties. Furthermore, this topic 
was not discussed in the minutes of the Codification Committee (法典調査会民法
議事速記録 ). Therefore, outwardly, it seems that Meiji lawmakers have not even 
conceived the idea of such a thing as marriage between same-sex parties. 
However, if we take a step deeper into materials relating to the civil law 
handbooks of the Boissonade and pre-Meiji codes, we find that this was not the 
case: the Boissonade Code had a consistent structure denying the validity of 
marriages that, for some reason, had been contracted by same-sex parties.
The Statement of Reasons for the first draft of the Boissonade Code makes a 
clear reference the “marriage between two men or two women (両男又ハ両女ノ
間ノ婚姻 )” in connection to the grounds for “inexistence (不成立 )” of marriage 
provided for by Article 85, item (i): “the marriage contracted due to mistaken 
identity or at a time of insanity shall be inexistent.” It reads:
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Are there any other cases of inexistence of marriage beyond these two? 
Since marriage is a community formed by men and women, it is obvious 
that a marriage contracted between two men or two women would be 
inexistent, therefore we need not spell it out. (民法草案人事篇理由書 , 1888, 
p. 74-75)
From this passage, we may infer that in the Boissonade Code the grounds of 
inexistence were not circumscribed to what was clearly spelled out in the Code: 
in the legal system envisioned by this old code, the theory of marriage 
inexistence was supposed to work as a ‘safety’ valve for unwritten conditions 
such as gender or the number of spouses. Although the few passages discussing 
this topic fail to make it clear – partially because it seems the very concept of 
‘marriage inexistence’ was not fully understood by Japanese scholars –, a brief 
look at the French civil law handbooks from that time reveals that the concept of 
inexistence was supposed to fit into the bundle of provisions regarding the 
validity of contracted marriages.
After the establishment of the Code Napoléon, the French legal academy 
built an unwritten principle to the effect that there shall be no nullity without 
text, i.e.: all grounds for nullity must be spelled out in the code (“pas de nullité 
sans texte”). This unwritten principle, however, would make it impossible to 
deny the validity of marriages not celebrated before the judge, marriages 
contracted without a valid consent from both parties, and marriages contracted 
between same-sex parties. In order to fix this problem that French scholars 
themselves envisaged a new concept, the notion of inexistence, to address all the 
‘conditions’ lawmakers had ‘forgotten’ to spell out in the code. Inexistence was 
thus not the same as nullity, as Japanese scholars misunderstood it, but rather it 
was developed to supplement the concept of ‘nullity’, which was subject to the 
principle “pas de nullité sans texte.”
Drawing from French scholars – who ironically had rejected the concept of 
inexistence a few decades later –, the drafters of the Code Boissonade decided to 
spell out the two main grounds for inexistence: intention to marry (or valid 
112
consent) and notification of marriage (civil celebration). As clearly put in the 
Statement of Reasons, lawmakers deemed unnecessary to spell out sexual 
difference out as grounds for inexistence because they believed that, following 
the French teaching, those grounds were not required to be limited to those listed 
in the code. Japanese scholars, however, misunderstood the concept of 
‘inexistence’ as being a mere synonym for ‘nullity’ in French. In their minds, 
apparently, “inexistence” was a perfect synonym for “nullity” ( 奥 田 , 1893, p. 
108). This misconstruction together with the relatively low importance given to 
the topic led lawmakers to a technical error: they decided to replace the word 
‘inexistence（不成立）’ for ‘nullity（無効）’ and write down the principle “pas de 
nullité sans texte:”
Art. 778. Marriage is void（無効）only in the following cases:
i) if one of the parties has no intention to marry due to mistaken identity or 
other cause; or
ii) if the parties do not lodge notification of marriage(...).
By understanding the concept of “inexistence” as a perfect synonym for 
“nullity” and limiting all the grounds for “nullity” to those spelled out in Article 
778, lawmakers made it technically impossible to deny the validity of marriages 
contracted by same-sex parties. Indeed, in retrospect, it is possible to argue that 
it would suffice to apply to the concept of “inexistence” with the same meaning 
it was used in France. Nevertheless, perhaps because the notion of “inexistence” 
had already been deemed to be equivalent to “nullity” in such a blunt manner, 
prewar civil law scholars took the discussion to a different level.
III. Sexual Difference in Civil Law 
Regardless of the era (Meiji, Taisho or Showa), all authors start from the 
assumption that marriage is a union between a man and a woman. However, the 
legal grounds for blocking marriage between same-sex parties oscillated 
between two main positions. The first theory claims that sexual difference is an 
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unwritten requirement (hereinafter, “unwritten requirement theory”). The second 
position is that the lack of sexual difference between the parties results in a lack 
of intention to marry, which is spelled out in the code (hereinafter, “intention to 
marry theory”).
In the Meiji Era (1868-1912) the earliest reference to the matter after the 
promulgation of the Meiji Code was Kakihara’s handbook ( 柿 原、1898-99). 
Kakihara opens the chapter about marriage law by defining marriage and thereby 
excluding same-sex couples from its scope. In his words,
 
No matter what kind of union is formed between a man and a man or a 
woman and a woman, there exists no marriage. From ancient times to the 
present, there are no examples of marriage contracted between same-sex 
parties. Needless to say, marriage can only be contracted between both sexes 
due to a natural need. In this regard, the legislator did not spell it out 
because such a provision would be useless. (柿原 , 1898-99, p. 137).
Although Kakihara was probably right in his assertion that lawmakers 
thought it was so obvious there was no need to write it down, he failed to notice 
the inconsistency such a construction would result with regards to the limitation 
on the grounds for nullity. As a matter of fact, Kakihara seems to ignore such 
limitation, even though Kenjiro Ume had already reaffirmed it in his “Essential 
of the Civil Code Vol. 4” (梅、1896-1901, p.114). 
This disregard for the text of the law is also seen in Sakamoto’s lecture 
notes. In contrast to Kakihara who simply makes reference to a ‘natural need’, 
Sakamoto argues that marriage between same-sex parties would be contrary to 
a) the purpose of the institution which lies in reproduction, and b) public order 
and morality (坂本 , p. 166). Indeed, in light of the view towards homosexuality 
back then, there would be room to rule a marriage void on grounds of violation 
of public order and morality if the reasons for nullity were not limited to the lack 
of marriage notification and intention to marry. Nevertheless, that was not the 
case, and this view was soon ‘challenged’ by Makino Kikunosuke. Makino also 
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excludes same-sex couples from the definition of marriage (牧野 , 1908, p. 167-
168). He does not stop there, however, equating gender to an intention to marry: 
“If marriage is contracted between two men or two women.... such marriage is 
void because, obviously, there cannot exist any intention to marry at all.” (牧野 , 
1908, p. 198).
In the first part of the Taisho Era (1912-1926) references to marriage 
between same-sex parties became scarce. Nevertheless, even though there is no 
mention to the topic, it is not possible to ignore Hozumi Shigeto’s “Digest of 
Family Law” (穂積 , 1917). That is not only because Shigeto became one of the 
most renowned family law scholars from prewar Japan, but also because for the 
first time in the Japanese civil law scholarship, an author stated that the purpose 
of marriage was NOT reproduction:
The purpose (of marriage) is not always to conceive a child. That is why 
infertility has not been made a ground for divorce or nullity; marriages 
between people unable to have children or aged are not forbidden. ( 穂 積 , 
1917, p. 61)
This view clearly influenced other scholars, who made sure to expresser 
their approval (柳川 , 1924, p. 169; 外岡 , 1924, p.114-115; 遠藤 , 1924, p. 81, 和
田 , 1925, p. 19-20、森本 , 1926, p. 44) and, sometimes, disapproval thereof (野
上 , 1928, p.118-119). Although it is still unclear whether it was a reaction from 
Hozumi’s audacious dissociation of marriage from reproduction or by the social 
boom in studies on homosexuality (or the scientific difference between genders), 
the fact is that a few years after that, the topic began to be discussed or 
mentioned in almost all civil law handbooks. In this period, sexual difference 
was relativized by women’s movements ( 婦 人 運 動 ) and advancements in the 
medical field. Moreover, authors feared that science might put an end to ‘sexual 
differences,’ as such differences would be explained through causes embedded 
in social structures.
It is possible to note this scientific development in the first mention to 
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gender differences in this period. In his family law handbook ( 岡 村 ,1922), 
Tsukasa Okamura discuss for the first time a hypothesis wherein one of the 
parties is intersex (called “hermaphrodite [ 半 陰 陽 ]” at the time). Without 
presenting any reason or argument, Okamura does not refrain from clearly 
stating that in such cases there would be no need to prove the equivalence of 
sexes. According to him, proving that sex/gender was unknown would suffice (
岡村 , 1922, p. 96-97).
The first author to notice the connection between untying marriage and 
reproduction (or sexual intercourse) and allowing or not marriage between 
same-sex parties seems to be Mojuro Tonooka. The ‘solution’ found by Tonooka 
was to argue that “(although sexual intercourse) is not a factor absolutely 
necessary in marriage (...) the rights and duties that rise between the couple are 
always related to sexual-intercourse (Regulated Sexual Relation)”… therefore, 
“Since the institution of marriage or the union between the husband and the wife 
is based on the physiological difference between the sexes, marriage (can only 
be) a union between a man and a woman (... and) the love between same-sex 
parties could never turn into a marriage.” ( 外 岡 , 1924, p. 113-115). 
Nevertheless, Tonooka falls short of maintaining logical consistency with 
regards to the grounds for nullity: even though he does not ignore the limitations, 
he does not explain what would happen if a marriage were contracted between 
same-sex parties. One year later, after expressing a view similar to Okamura, 
Uichi Wada – likely because he was fully aware of this inconsistency – clearly 
stated that understanding sexual equivalence as grounds for nullity was merely 
his own opinion, something relatively rare in civil law handbooks even 
nowadays:
Although there is no specific provision in the Civil Code concerning same-
sex marriage, i.e. marriage between men or marriage between women, such 
provision was merely omitted because it is obvious that the sex of the 
parties needs to be different as a marriage requirement. (The silence) does 
not intend to allow sexual equivalence between the parties. Indeed, also with 
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regards to nullity and annulment of marriage, there are no provisions saying 
that a marriage contracted between same-sex parties should be voided or 
annulled (...) Nevertheless, I believe that the marriage between same-sex 
parties should be construed as being void even though there is not a 
provision spelling it out in the code. (和田 , 1925, p. 281)
This expression, “I believe that... should be construed as... (余は…と解する
)” is not only unusual in the civil law writings in general, but also extremely 
abrupt in relation to Wada’s own style. It is an euphemistic way of saying that 
“although I cannot give a convincing explanation, my opinion is...”. Although 
there are many other issues – such as his views regarding intersex or feminism 
which are particularly important when discussing gender differences in marriage 
– to be addressed with regards to Wada’s work, delving into it would be out of 
the scope of this article.
In the end of the Taisho period, Arata Iwata finally established the 
interpretation that would become the standard method of denying the validity of 
marriage between same-sex parties until the end of the 20th century while 
keeping the consistency with the limitation on grounds for nullity: he argued that 
there would exist no intention to marry in case “the other party was of the same 
sex or of a neutral (sic) sex.” ( 岩田 , 1926, p. 25-26). Nevertheless, Iwata only 
indicated the solution and did not go into any details as to why it should be 
construed like that. The first time something similar to the “substantial intention” 
theory appeared was in Hisayuki Nokata’s “Commentary on Family Law” (野上、
1928) in the beginning of the Showa Era (1926-1989). This theory is attributed 
to Zennosuke Nawagawa and became the basis for refuting intention to marry 
between same-sex parties – According to Nokata: 
The intention to marry consists of the establishment of the civil status of 
‘marriage couple (husband and wife; 夫婦 )’, which is determined only by 
social views (...) marriage between same-sex parties is void because it is 
impossible to understand such intention as an intention to marry in 
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conformity with social views. (野方 , 1928, p.159-160)
Indeed, Iwata, and for that matter also Makino two decades earlier, had 
already pointed out that the equivalence of sex between the parties would result 
in the nullity of their marriage due to lack of intention. Nevertheless, because 
Makino used the notion of “carnal mistake,” borrowed from the Statement of 
Reasons from the Boissonade code, that interpretation failed to explain the lack 
of validity in cases where the parties were not mistaken as to the sex of their 
spouses. In contrast to that, Nokata made reference to the “social view” of 
marriage, which, according to him, was the only means of determining the 
‘contents’ of marriage, and consequently, the ‘content’ of the intention to marry. 
This passage itself is of extreme importance because it demonstrates that a) the 
so-called “substantial intention” theory is historically deeply related to refuting 
marriage between same-sex couples and that b) it cannot be necessarily 
attributed to Zennosuke Nakagawa’s family law doctrine (“law of personal 
status [ 身 分 法 ]”). Nevertheless, Nokata’s commentary also stands out with 
regards to his views on how the relationship between marriage and reproduction 
should be understood. In contrast with the wide acceptance of Hozumi’s view 
that reproduction was not a legal purpose of marriage under Japanese law, 
Nokata clearly stated that “it cannot be generalized based on an exception that 
reproduction is not one of the purposes of marriage. That would be tantamount 
to saying that the spiritual union ( 精 神 的 結 合 ) is not one of the purposes of 
marriage because our code does not spell it out as grounds for divorce.” (野方 , 
1928, p. 118-119).
Zennosuke Nakagawa, who supposedly created the “substantial intention 
theory”, only published his “Outline of the Law of Personal Status” in 1930 (中
川 , 1930). Although the “substantial intention theory” came to be understood as 
an essential part of the recognition of civil effects of marriage for unmarried 
couples – that was one of Nakagawa’s main contributions to Japanese family 
law –, in his original work, Nakagawa is only worried about distinguishing 
family relationships from patrimonial relationships. He is does not really address 
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how the intention to marry should be construed or what should be its contents. 
The first time he refers to something similar to the “view commonly accepted by 
society (社会通念 )” is in his civil law textbook published in 1933 (中川、1933) in 
which he states that “(the intention to marry) is the intention to build a 
relationship that is considered as marriage according to normal social judgment 
(社会の正常的な判断 )...” (中川 , 1933, p. 55-56). Even though Nakagawa does 
not refer to Nogami, the lack of such a discussion in his previous work – he does 
not question the definition of the intention to marry in his later work either (中川
, 1941) –, and the very fact that he only mentions marriage between same-sex 
parties in connection to the abovementioned passage indicates that he has not 
given further thought to that matter and is merely writing down a commonly 
accepted view.
In 1935, summarizing all the civil law doctrine and case law at the time, 
Kihachiro Takakubo’s “Overview of Legal Doctrine and Case Law – Vol 5-2: 
Family Law: Part 1” ( 高 窪 , 1935) clearly states that the most commonly 
accepted view ( 通 説 ) is that “the parties to marriage must be a man and a 
woman.” The very reference to a “most commonly accepted view” indicates 
that, although there were no specific studies, the topic was being widely 
discussed by civil law scholars. This “pandect” of Japanese law also indicates 
the definition of “intention to marry” had not been discussed prior to Nogami’s 
commentary (高窪 , 1935, p. 415).
Although there are a few other authors that should be mentioned in the 
Showa Era, it might be important to mention the only scholar who refused to 
accept Nogami’s view pointing out a fundamental issue within it: Shiko 
Yakushiji. In Yakushiji’s words:
Marriage must be a union between one man and one woman. Therefore, a 
marriage agreement made between same-sex persons runs afoul of the 
essence of marriage and shall be deemed void. Some scholars say that this is 
a case of nullity on the grounds of lack of intention to marry because there 
would exist no intention towards a marriage as it is commonly accepted by 
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society (...) Nevertheless, if a person who is biologically male is raised as a 
female due to a mistake of the parents and, believing to be a female, that 
person marries a male, that person’s intention to marry would exist in light 
of the intention to marry as commonly accepted by society. Hence, such an 
agreement should be construed as being void on the grounds that it is 
contrary to the essence of marriage. (薬師寺 , 1939, p. 418)
As soon as 1939, Yakushiji had already realized that explaining the marriage 
impediment concerning same-sex couples through the intention to marry as 
determined by a general ‘common sense’ was not enough to deny the validity of 
all marriages contracted by same-sex parties. He could probably not imagine 
that this “general common sense” regarding marriage would change and make 
his criticism even more pertinent. Nevertheless, he was unable to propose an 
alternate solution for preventing marriages between same-sex parties without 
ignoring the limitations on the grounds of nullity imposed by the Civil Code.
In 1942, Zennosuke Nakagawa finally fully adopted the “substantial 
intention theory,” which would become the “most commonly accept view” for 
rest of the 20th century, and came up with his aforementioned metaphor 
according to which marrying a person of the same-sex would be like marrying 
science or marrying a book. 
IV. Final Remarks
In his family law textbook, Omura Atsushi, reflecting a the commonly 
accepted view, points out that “this issue (marriage between same-sex parties) 
has barely been put into question in Japan,” and, on a footnote, added that 
“Recently, the number of textbooks mentioning same-sex marriage is 
increasing.” ( 大 村 , 2010, p. 134). The short analysis made by this study is 
enough to demonstrate that this widely accepted assumption is simply not true: 
the issue was widely discussed in prewar Japan, being mentioned in most civil 
law handbooks. More importantly, it demonstrates that the “substantial intention 
theory” was the only solution found by prewar scholars after a three-decade long 
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controversy. 
Perhaps because marriage between same-sex parties stopped being discussed 
altogether, few or no civil law scholars made the connection between the 
“substantial intention theory” and same-sex marriage after the Second World 
War. The “substantial intention theory” was absorbed by Zennosuke Nakagawa’s 
family law theory, and its most important function became determining whether 
a de facto marriage exists or not. With the increasing criticism towards 
Nakagawa’s theory on de facto unions, the “substantial intention theory” lost its 
ruling position among civil law scholars who, failing to notice its connection to 
the same-sex marriage issue, criticized it as being completely arbitrary and 
proposed entirely new theories, which, in turn, do not provide legal grounds for 
denying the validity of marriage between same-sex couples.
It might be argued that this legal discussion ceased because of the new 
Constitution of 1946 that states in Article 24 that ‘marriage is contracted based 
only on the mutual consent of both sexes.(1)’ If scholars and lawyers believed that 
Article 24 prohibited same-sex marriage, there would be no need to justify this 
prohibition in the Civil Code. Nevertheless, this prohibitive construction of 
Article 24 seems to have surfaced after the topic began to be discussed again in 
the 1980s, and I could not find any scholar who actually defended such 
interpretation(2). As a matter of fact, as soon as 1949, Sakae Wagatsuma, the most 
eminent civil law scholar of postwar Japan, had already stated that the only 
purpose of this provision was to guarantee that that “the free will of the 
contracting parties does not be bound by others.” (我妻 , 1949, p. 56).
Rather than an obstruction to same-sex marriage, by introducing gender 
Art. 24. Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be 
maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.
The earliest mention usually used as a reference is Minoru Ishikawa’s paper, one of the earliest 
legal papers on same-sex marriage in Japan. Notwithstanding, even in this paper, which is 
marked by what under current standards would be deemed discriminatory language, the author 
only says that Art. 24’s wording ‘could’ be used to exclude same-sex couples from the institution 
of marriage (Ishikawa, 1984, p. 60). It seems that such interpretation has never been truly 
espoused by any scholar, only mentioned as a possibility. 
(1)
(2)
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equality and individual dignity as basic principles of family law, the new 
Constitution makes it difficult to deny marriage between same-sex couples 
within the Civil Code. Indeed, under the Meiji Code, the civil status of a 
“husband” and that of a “wife” entailed different rights and duties, which were 
supposed to complement each other. In contrast to that, the new Constitution 
prevents the legislator from establishing such distinction, thereby dissociating 
the married status from the sexual difference between the spouses. Under the 
“substantial intention theory,” it would seem contrary to the constitution to 
divide the intention to marry into the “intention to become a husband” and the 
“intention to become a wife.”
Does this explanation mean that the current Japanese Civil Code allows 
marriage between same-sex couples? The answer to that question seems to be 
yet unsure. It does not seem to have a legal construction preventing marriages 
between same-sex couples from happening that does not fall into contradictions 
or one that do not arbitrarily impose the interpreter’s view on marriage. Apart 
from an scholarly interest in deepening our understanding of the structure of 
marriage law – which is of extreme importance –, what we need to ask ourselves 
is whether is it worthy to go through so much trouble, and fall into 
contradictions or bring back old views that had already been overcome a long 
time ago, only to prevent same-sex couples from contracting marriage or to deny 
the validity of same-sex marriages contracted outside of Japan.
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<Summary>
Daniel Machado 
‘Until very recently, there was almost no discussion concerning marriage 
between same-sex couples in Japan.’ I have stated that a few times in my prior 
works not only because it is a widespread belief among Japanese legal scholars, 
but because during my master research, I looked into it and, indeed, I did not find 
any papers on the topic. The scarce literature almost forced me to change my 
research topic. Nevertheless, three years after I finished my master thesis, I 
randomly stumbled upon a paper referring to a prewar civil law handbook that 
apparently mentioned something about the issue. I quickly learned that it was 
merely the end of the thread of a legal discussion that stretched back to the very 
codification process of the Japanese civil code. Bringing back this lost discussion, 
identifying its origins in French Law, rediscovering its place within Japanese 
family law, and demonstrating its implications became the topic of my doctoral 
degree. In this paper, I summarize part of my findings concerning prewar Japan in 
an attempt to shed some light on a matter that appears to have been avoided by 
legal scholars in Japan: can Japanese marriage law as provided in the Civil Code 
really be construed as requiring sexual difference as a substantial condition for 
marriage? First, I analyze references to the issue in the codifying process (II). 
Next, I describe the scholarly discussions carried out from the end of the Meiji 
Era to the early 1940s, before the end of World War II (III). Finally, I make some 
remarks as to the meaning this seemingly old controversy may have with regards 
to the current discussion (IV).

